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Abstract: We introduce the concept of reliability in watermarking as the abil-
ity of assessing that a probability of false alarm is very low and below a given
significance level. We propose an iterative and self-adapting algorithm which
estimates very low probabilities of error. It performs much quicker and more
accurately than a classical Monte Carlo estimator. The article finishes with
applications to zero-bit watermarking (probability of false alarm, error expo-
nent), and to probabilistic fingerprinting codes (probability of wrongly accusing
a given user, code length estimation).
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matique” under project NEBBIANO, ANR-06-SETIN-009. This work has been patented.
Evaluation expérimentale de la fiabilité de
procédés de filigrane et tatouage de données
numériques
Résumé : Nous introduisons la notion de fiabilité pour le tatouage et les fil-
igranes numériques comme la possibilité de verifier numériquement que la prob-
abilité de fausse alarme est très petite, et en dessous d’un certain niveau. Nous
proposons un algorithme itératif et adaptatif qui estime de très petites proba-
bilités d’erreur. Il s’execute beaucoup plus rapidement, et avec avec une plus
grande précision, que l’estimateur classique de Monte-Carlo. L’article conclut
avec des applications au filigrane “zero-bit” (probabilité de fausse alarme, taux
d’erreur exponentiel), et au tatouage utilisant des codes probabilistes (proba-
bilité d’accuser à tort un utilisateur donné, estimation de la longueur du code)
Mots-clés : Probabilité de fausse alarme, courbe ROC, événement rare
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1 Introduction
Watermark decoders are in essence stochastic processes. There are at least three
sources of randomness: the unknown original content (for blind decoders), the
unknown hidden message and the unknown attack the watermarked content has
undergone. The output of the decoder is thus a random variable and this leads
to a very disturbing fact: there will be errors in some decoded messages. This
also holds for watermark detectors which have to take the decision whether the
content under scrutiny has been watermarked or not.
1.1 Watermarking reliability
In order to be used in an application, a watermarking technique must be reliable.
We introduce here the concept of reliability as the guarantee that not only
these inherent errors very rarely happen, but also that their frequency or their
probability is assessed to be below a given level. Here are two application
scenarii where a wrong estimation of the probability of error could lead to a
disaster.
Copy protection. Assume commercial contents are encrypted and water-
marked and that future consumer electronics storage devices have a watermark
detector. These devices refuse to record a watermarked content. The probability
of false alarm is the probability that the detector considers an original piece of
content (which has not been watermarked) as protected. The movie that a user
shot during his holidays could be rejected by his storage device. This absolutely
non user-friendly behavior really scares consumer electronics manufacturers. In
the past, the Copy Protection Working Group of the DVD forum evaluated
that at most one false alarm should happen in 400 hours of video [1]. As the
detection rate was one decision per ten seconds, this implies a probability of
false alarm in the order of 10−5. An accurate experimental assessment of such
a low probability of false alarm would demand to feed a real-time watermarking
detector with non-watermarked content during 40,000 hours, i.e. more than 4
years! Proposals in response of the CPTWG’s call were, at that time, never
able to guarantee this level of reliability.
Fingerprinting. In this application, users’ identifiers are embedded in pur-
chased content. When content is found in an illegal place (e.g. a P2P network),
the right holders decode the hidden message, find a serial number, and thus
they can trace the traitor, i.e. the customer who has illegally broadcast his
copy. However, the task is not that simple because dishonest users might col-
lude. For security reason, anti-collusion codes have to be employed. Yet, these
solutions (also called weak traceability codes [2]) have a non-zero probability
of error (defined as the probability of accusing an innocent). This probability
should be, of course, extremely low, but it is also a very sensitive parameter:
anti-collusion codes get longer (in terms of the number of bits to be hidden in
content) as the probability of error decreases. Fingerprint designers have to
strike a trade-off, which is hard to conceive when only a rough estimation of the
probability of error is known. The major issue for fingerprinting algorithms is
the fact that embedding large sequences implies also assessing reliability on a
huge amount of data which may be practically unachievable without using rare
event analysis.
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1.2 Prior works
Estimation of probabilities of false alarm or Bit and Message Error Rate have
been a concern of watermark designers since the beginning. A first choice is
to derive the formula of this probability. However, this is often impossible or
with the restricting assumption that the real data fit the statistic model used
in the derivation. The decoder’s decision is often based on a value of score,
which writes as a sum of many and more or less independent random extracted
features. This explains the abusive resort to the Central Limit Theorem to
establish the probability that this score reaches a given value: The score is
supposed to be Gaussian distributed and the probability is expressed with the
erf function [3, 4]. However, even if the conditions are sometimes fulfilled to
apply the CLT, the convergence rate to the Gaussian law is very crucial and
depends on the third moment of the extracted features (in the most simple case)
as stated by the Berry-Esséen bound [5]. Roughly speaking, a small probability
of error amounts to integrate the tail of the cdf of the score, where the CLT
approximation by a Gaussian law is very bad. A better way is to calculate
upper bounds (Chernoff’s bound, union bound, nearest neighbor bound). The
issue is then about the tightness of the bound, which is usually good only over a
precise range of parameter values. Numerical approximations of the probability
formula also exist like the Beaulieu method [6] or the DFT method [7] used
when the score is the summation of i.i.d. random variables. However, they need
the true pdf or the characteristic function of these variables.
When these approaches are not possible, then the last choice is the experi-
mental estimation. However, we have seen in watermarking articles [8, 9, 3, 4]
that experimental estimation were only based on the Monte Carlo (MC) method,
which is very inefficient for a low probability of error. This naive approach con-
sists in running n experiments and to count the number of times k that the
decoder failed. Then, the probability of error p is estimated by the frequency
that error happened on this set of experiments: p̂ = k/n. Let Xi denote the
result of the i-th experiment. Xi equals 1 if there is a decoding error, 0 else.
Xi is then a Bernoulli random variable, and K =
∑n
i=1 Xi is a binomial r.v.:
K ∼ B(n, p), whose expectation is E[K] = np and variance Var[K] = np(1−p).
The estimator p̂ is unbiased (E[p̂] = p) and its variance, Var[p̂] = p(1 − p)/n,
asymptotically goes to zero. However, one needs at least around p−1 experi-
ments to make it work, and even worse, its relative standard deviation is given
by
√
Var[p̂]/E[p̂] ≈ 1/√pn. Hence, for a decent accuracy of the estimator re-
flected here by its relative standard deviation, n must be taken as several times
bigger than p−1. This method is thus inadequate for estimating a probability
below 10−6 because it then needs millions of experiments.
As far as we know, almost nothing concerning experimental estimation of low
probability of errors has been done by the watermarking community although
there exist better methods than the simple Monte Carlo (MC) simulations [10].
They have been successfully applied, for instance, to estimate frequencies of
packet losses in digital communications [11]. We guess that, sadly, the water-
marking community is more image processing oriented, so that people usually
ignore these recent tools. Yet, the application of these methods to watermarking
is not trivial, because they assume a proper statistical model which may not
be suitable for watermarking. There is a need for very general or self-adaptive
methods resorting to the fewest as possible assumptions.
INRIA
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This article proposes a new experimental method estimating low probabili-
ties of error for watermarking applications. It is a strong adaptation of a complex
method whose good properties have been theoretically proven in [12]. Section
2 presents as simply as possible this adaptation and Section III experimentally
validates the approach for a very simple scenario of watermarking detection
(a.k.a. zero-bit watermarking). Section 4 applies the method to a more diffi-
cult watermarking problem: the experimental measurement of error exponents
under attacks, the reliability of Tardos code in the fingerprinting application.
2 Our algorithm
Before explaining the method, let us first describe zero-bit watermarking within
a few lines. A watermark detector receives two types of contents: original
contents and watermarked (possibly attacked) contents. It decides the type
of the piece of content under scrutiny based on the observation of L features
extracted from the content, whose values are stacked in a vector x. Then,
it calculates the likelihood that this vector is watermarked thanks to a score
function d(.) : RL 7→ R. It decides that the content is watermarked if d(x) is
above a given threshold τ. The probability of false alarm pfa is the probability
that d(x) > τ whereas the piece of content has not been watermarked. The
probability of false negative pfn is the probability that d(x) < τ when the
content is indeed watermarked. The reliability of the watermarking technique
is assessed if pfa is below a small level. From a geometrical point of view, let us
define the acceptance region A ⊂ RL as the set of vectors x such that d(x) > τ.
For the sake of simplicity, we explain the proposed method when applied on
zero-bit watermarking. The key idea of our experimental method is to gradually
encourage the occurrences of the rare event (here a false alarm) by generating a
sequence of events which are rarer and rarer. In terms of probability, we factorize
the very small probability to be estimated in a product of bigger probabilities
and thus easier to estimate. Our estimator can be written as p̂fa =
∏N
i=1 p̂i.
2.1 Key idea
To factorize a probability into a product of bigger probabilities, we use the
following trick: let AN = A be the rare event, and AN−1 a related event such
that when AN occurs, AN−1 has also occured. However, when AN−1 occurs,
it doesn’t imply that AN is true. Hence, AN−1 is less rare an event than AN .
This justifies the first equality in the following equation, the second one being
just the Bayes rule:
Prob[AN ] = Prob[AN , AN−1] = Prob[AN |AN−1].Prob[AN−1]. (1)
Repeating the process, we finally obtain:
pfa = Prob[AN ]
= Prob[AN |AN−1]Prob[AN−1|AN−2] . . .Prob[A2|A1]Prob[A1] (2)
provided that {Aj}Nj=1 is a sequence of nested events. Knowing that estima-
tion of a probability is easier when its value is bigger, we have succeeded in
decomposing a hard problem into N much easier problems.
RR n° 6636
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This decomposition is very general, but the construction of this sequence of
nested events is usually not a simple task. An exception is when the rare event
AN admits a geometrical interpretation: AN occurs when x ∈ AN . A sequence
of nested events translates then in a sequence of subsets A1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ AN−1 ⊂
AN . The task is even simpler in zero-bit watermarking because an indicator
function of these events can be as follows: x ∈ Aj if d(x) > τj . Nested events
are created for a sequence of increasing thresholds: τ1 < τ2 < · · · < τN = τ.
2.2 Generation of vectors
The first step of our algorithm estimates p1 = Prob[A1]. In practice, N is large
enough so that this probability is not lower than 0.1. Then, a classical MC
estimator is efficient. However, the variance of the estimator p̂1 has a strong
impact on the variance of p̂fa. Therefore, the number of trials n1 is several
times bigger than p−11 , while being far less than p
−1
fa , the order of magnitude of
the number of trials needed for a direct MC estimator of the probability of false
alarm.
For this first step, we must generate n1 vectors x. Either we have a good
statistical model, i.e. the pdf pX of these extracted features accurately captures
the reality. Then, it is not difficult to generate synthetic data, i.e. pseudo-
random vectors that follow the statistical behavior of the extracted features.
Or, we feed the watermarking detector with n1 natural images. We count the
number k1 of vectors whose score is higher than τ1.
As a byproduct, this first step leads not only to an estimator but also to a
generator of the event A1. It is not very efficient, as it produces vectors x ∼ pX
and then select those vectors belonging to the set A1. Hence, approximately
only p1n1 occurrences of the event A1 are produced.
2.3 Replication of vectors
The issue of the second step is the estimation of the probability p2 = Prob[A2|A1].
We set the threshold τ2 just above τ1, so that this probability is large (typically
not lower than 0.1). Once again, a MC estimator is p̂2 = k2/n2, where k2 is the
number of vectors x of the set A1 which also belong to A2. We need to generate
n2 vectors x distributed according to pX and in the set A1. We could the first
step of the algorithm to generate these vectors, but it is not efficient enough as
such.
We then resort to a so-called replication process, which almost multiplies by
a factor ρ the size of a collection of vectors in a particular region of the space.
For each vector of this collection, we make ρ copies of it, and then we slightly
modify the copies in a random manner. This modification process must leave
the distribution of the data invariant: if its inputs are distributed according to
pX, its outputs follow the same distribution. A modified copy is likely to belong
to the set if the modification is light. However, we check whether this is really
the case, and go back to the original vector if not. The replication process is
thus a modification (line 15 in Alg. 1) followed by a filter (line 16). It leaves the
distribution of the vector invariant.
Since we have run the first step, we have k1 vectors in A1. We choose a
replication factor ρ1 ≈ p̂1 more or less conserving the same amount of vectors
because the second probability to be estimated has the same order of magnitude
INRIA
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than the first one and n1 was enough for that purpose. We calculate the score of
the ρ1k1 modified copies. We conserve the copies whose score is bigger than τ1,
and replace the other ones by their original vector. This makes the n2 = ρ1k1
input vectors of the MC estimator. Again, these two first steps lead to an
estimator p̂2 of p2, but also to a mean to generate occurrences of the event A2.
The core of the algorithm is thus the following one. A selection process
kills the vectors (named particles in statistics) whose score is lower than an
intermediate threshold τi, these are branched on selected particles. A replication
process proposes randomly modified particles and filters the ones that are still
above the intermediate threshold. Selection and replication steps are iterated
to estimate the remaining probabilities p̂3, · · · , p̂N .
2.4 Adaptive threshold
The difficulty is now to give the appropriate values to the thresholds {τi}N−11 ,
and also to the sizes of the sets {ni}N1 . The probabilities to be estimated must
not be very weak in order to maintain reasonable set sizes. Moreover, it can be
shown that the variance of p̂fa is minimized when the probabilities {pi}Ni are
equal. However, to set the correct value of the thresholds, we would need the
map τ = F−1(p) which we have not. Otherwise, we would already know what
the value of pfa = F (τ) is.
The idea is to set the thresholds adaptively. The number of vectors is con-
stant in all the experimental rounds: ni = n ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·N}. The threshold τi has
the value such that ki = k. k and n are thus the parameters of the algorithm.
The estimated probabilities are all equal to p̂i = p = k/n, ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·N − 1}.
It means that the selection process sorts the scores in a decreasing order, and
adaptively sets τi as the value of the k-th higher score. Vectors whose score
are below this threshold are removed from the stack, and replaced by copies of
vectors above. This means that the size of the stack is constant and that the
replication factors {ρi} are all equal to n/k (k divides n). All the vectors in the
stack are independently modified. The modification of a vector is accepted if
its new score is still above the threshold.
The last step is reached when τi > τ. Then, we set N = i, τN = τ and kN
is the number of scores above τ, so that, for this last iteration, p̂N = kN/n. At
the end, the probability of false alarm is estimated by:
p̂fa =
kN
n
pN−1. (3)
We stress the fact that, formally, N , kN and {τi}N1 are indeed random variables
and their estimations in the algorithm should be denoted by N̂ , k̂N̂ and {τ̂i}Ni=1.
For the sake of clarity, we did not use different notations from the deterministic
case of the preceding section. The number of iterations is expected to be as
follows:
E[N ] = ⌊log p−1fa / log p−1⌋+ 1. (4)
The total number of detector trials is nN , which has a logarithmic scale with
respect to p−1fa , whereas a classical MC estimator would need at least p
−1
fa trials.
The method is given in pseudo-code in Algorithm 1. Note that the thresholds
{τi} are stored in memory. This is not useful when estimating pfa, but this gives
a nice byproduct for ROC curves: the map p = f(τ) is estimated through the
RR n° 6636
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following points: {(pj , τj)}N−1j=1 . From [12], the method inherits the asymptotic
properties of consistency and normality. With equations:
p̂fa
a.s.−−−−−→
n→+∞
pfa (5)
√
n(p̂fa − pfa) L−−−−−→
n→+∞
N (0, σ2) (6)
with
σ2 & p2fa
(
(N − 1)1− p
p
+
1− pN
pN
)
(7)
We can also show that, in the asymptotic regime, the bias decreases inversely
proportional with n:
E
[
p̂fa − pfa
pfa
]
=
1
n
N(1− p)
p
+ o(n−1), (8)
which means that E[(p̂fa − pfa)/pfa] & αn−1, where α is always a positive
number. A remarkable fact is that the bias is positive, so that estimations
tend to over-estimate the probability of rare event. In concrete situations, the
rare event often corresponds to a catastrophic scenario to be prevented, and
over-estimating is then a nice property.
2.5 Some improvements
This subsection proposes some improvements of Algorithm 1. If n is huge, the
subroutine HIGHER SCORE must be carefully implemented. In general, an efficient
way is to use the quick-sort algorithm whose complexity is on average O(n log n).
If n = 2k, a median algorithm is recommended because its complexity is on
average O(n).
The most restrictive part is that, so far in Algorithm 1, k must divide n:
The k selected vectors {yi}k1 are each replicated n/k times (line 14). To take
over this restriction, we create a subroutine SELECT which randomly picks up
n vectors from the set {yi}k1 . Each yi is thus replicated a random number of
times, whose expectation is n/k. Algorithm 2 shows an implementation, where
each vector is at least selected once, and where it is selected a constant number
of times if k divides n.
3 Application to zero-bit watermarking
This part first applies the method to a well-known watermarking detector for
which there exist bounds and a numerical method to derive the probability of
false alarm. This allows to benchmark the method and to fine-tune its param-
eters.
We have selected the absolute value of the normalized correlation [13] as the
score function, so that x is deemed watermarked if:
d(x) =
|xT u|
‖x‖ > τ (9)
INRIA
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Algorithm 1 Estimation of the probability that d(x) > τ , when x ∼ pX.
Require: subroutines GENERATE, HIGHER SCORE & MODIFY
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: xi ← GENERATE(pX); dxi ← d(xi);
3: end for
4: N ← 1;
5: τN ← HIGHER SCORE(dx, k); τ ′ ← τN;
6: while τ ′ < τ and N < Nmax do
7: t← 1;
8: for i = 1 to n do
9: if dxi ≥ τ ′ then
10: yt ← xi; dyt = dxi; t← t + 1;
11: end if
12: end for
13: for i = 1 to k do
14: for j = 1 to n/k do
15: z← MODIFY(yi);
16: if d(z) > τ ′ then
17: x(i−1)n/k+j ← z; dx(i−1)n/k+j ← d(z);
18: else
19: x(i−1)n/k+j ← yi; dx(i−1)n/k+j ← dyi;
20: end if
21: end for
22: end for
23: N ← N + 1
24: τN ← HIGHER SCORE(dx, k); τ ′ ← τN;
25: end while
26: k′ ← 0;
27: for i = 1 to n do
28: if dxi > τ then
29: k′ ← k′ + 1;
30: end if
31: end for
32: return p̂fa =
k′kN−1
nN
;
Algorithm 2 SELECT: Random selection of n objects among a set of size k.
Require: subroutine GENERATE RAND PERM
π = GENERATE RAND PERM (k);
for i = 1 to n do
Index(i) = π( mod (i, k) + 1);
end for
return vector Index;
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where u is a secret vector whose norm equals one. A geometrical interpretation
shows that the acceptance region is a two-sheet hypercone whose axis is given
by u and whose angle is θ = cos−1(τ) (with 0 < θ < π/2). Hence, for an
isotropic distribution whose probability density function only depends on the
norm of x, the probability of false alarm is the proportion of the solid angle of the
hypercone compared to the solid angle of the full space: pfa = IL(θ)/IL(π/2),
with IL(θ) =
∫ θ
0
sinL−2(u)du (L ≥ 2). The authors of [9] derived a simple
program numerically calculating the probability of false alarm based on iterative
integration by part. Yet, when implemented in Matlab or standard C, this
program fails calculating very weak probabilities, due to computer precision
limit. For this reason, they proposed an upper and lower bound, respectively
based on a Gaussian and a Fisher Z-statistic approximations:
2erfc
(
1
2
log
1 + τ
1− τ
√
L− 2
)
≤ pfa ≤ 2erfc(τ
√
L) (10)
Indeed, a much better way is to resort to the Fisher-Snedecor F-distribution.
If x belongs to the acceptance region, then the angle 〈x,u〉 is smaller than θ
or bigger than π − θ. Instead of a cosine, we translate this in term of tangent:
tan2(< x,u >) < tan2 θ, with tan2(< x,u >) = ‖(I − P)x‖2/‖Px‖2. Here, P
is the projector matrix: Px = (xT u)u, and I the L × L identity matrix. We
suppose that x is a white Gaussian noise, as an example of isotropic distribution:
pX = N (0, IL). Therefore, its projections on complementary subspaces Px
and (I−P)x are independent and Gaussian distributed. This implies that
‖Px‖2 and ‖(I−P)x‖2 are chi-square with one and L − 1 degrees of freedom
respectively, and that the random variable F = ‖(I−P)x‖2/(L − 1)‖Px‖2
has a Fisher-Snedecor F-distribution. Consequently, pfa = Prob[F < (L −
1)−1 tan2 θ]. This is by definition the cumulative distribution function whose
expression relies on incomplete beta function. After simplifications, we have:
pfa = I(1− τ2;
L− 1
2
,
1
2
), (11)
with I(x; a, b) the regularized incomplete beta function. Matlab or Mathematica
provides far more accurate approximations than those proposed in [9].
The random vector x being a white Gaussian noise, the replication process
modifies x into z = (x + µn)/
√
1 + µ2, with n ∼ N (0, IL). Hence, z is still
a white Gaussian noise with unit variance. This defines the GENERATE and
MODIFY processes in Alg. 1.
3.1 Experimental investigation # 1: strength of the repli-
cation
The main shortcoming of our algorithm is that the parameter µ needs a manual
fine-tuning. The algorithm as described above works fine for the problem studied
in this section when µ = 0.2. This value sets the strength of the replication
process, which can be expressed as the expected square distance between the
modified vector z and its initial value x. Here, this square distance is equal to
2L(1 − (1 + µ2)−1/2). The strength of the replication fixes the dynamic of the
system. There is a trade-off to be found between two undesirable effects. The
goal of this subsection is to experimentally show and explain these two effects
INRIA
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and to find a trick to circumvent this manual fine-tuning shortcoming. The
others parameters are set as follows: L = 20, τ = 0.95, n = 6400. This gives
pfa = 4.704 ∗ 10−11. We have found that µ = 0.2 is a correct value because
the algorithm behaves as expected. However, a greater or a lower value have
negative impacts as we shall see.
As the estimator goes, the set Ai is smaller and smaller, and the modification
process is more and more likely to move vectors out of this set when the strength
is too big. Let us define the filtering rate of the replication process as the number
of times a modification is refused divided by n. Figure 1 shows this filtering
rate along the iteration number. Typically, a factor µ greater than 0.5 (red
curves) yields a filtering rate of 100% for the last iterations. This implies that
the particules and their scores are not renewed any longer. Thus, threshold τj
saturates and the algorithm does not converge. It stops thanks to the constraint
on the maximum number of iterations Nmax = 100. We seize the opportunity
of this case study where the true map p = F (τ) is known to plot the relative
error along the ROC curve (pj − F (τj))/F (τj) in Figure 2. Red curves were
simulated for a strong replication strength: µ = 0.7. We observe that, when the
filtering rate is too high, the relative error has a peak followed by an exponential
decay towards −1. The peak is explained by the fact that the vectors and their
scores are no longer renewed, so that the thresholds quickly converge towards
the supremum of these scores. Once the thresholds saturate to this supremum,
F (τj) became fixed, and the relative error has an exponential decay due to the
term pj . When this latter becomes negligible compared to F (τj), the relative
error tends to −1.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
iterations
fi
lt
e
ri
n
g
 r
a
te
 
 
mu = 0.01
mu = 0.7
Figure 1: Filtering rate for 10 estimator runs with µ = 0.7, and 10 estimator
runs with µ = 0.01.
The impact of a small µ is not noticeable in the filtering rate which is far
below the saturation phenomenon (see Fig. 1). Yet, Fig. 2 shows very strong
relative errors (blue curves) in the first iterations. Factor µ is so weak that
replicated particules are almost located at the same place as the previous ones.
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This prevents us from exploring the space due to a low dynamic and from
moving the vectors towards the acceptance region. Hence, the scores of the
replicated particules are almost the same scores than the previous ones. This
is almost as if µ = 0, i.e. classical Monte Carlo. The behavior of the relative
error is then strongly dependent on the initialization process which yields the
first set of particules. The selection process keeps a thiner and thiner portion
(k/n)j of this initial cloud of particules and the intermediate threshold converges
to the maximum of the initial scores. Once this is achieved, the intermediate
thresholds saturate to this maximum value, and we again observe an exponential
decay toward −1 (Fig. 2 - blue curves). To check our explanations, we plotted
the values of the intermediate thresholds in Fig. 3. For the iteration number
giving a maximum of relative error in Fig.2, we plot a circle centered on the
maximum score of the initial particles. This illustrates the dependence between
this maximum initial score and the saturated intermediate threshold.
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Figure 2: Relative errors for the same estimator runs as used in Fig. 1.
The best trade-off can be stated in the following terms: find the maximum
value of µ such that the filtering rate is below a given level. We modify Alg. 1
as follows. µ is set to one at the beginning. For each iteration, we measure the
filtering rate. If this latter is bigger than the level, we reduce the value of µ and
repeat the iteration until the filtering rate is below the level. The value of µ is
thus now found adaptively. However, the number of detection trials is no longer
fixed. Experimentally, we decrease µ by a factor 1.1 anytime the filtering rate
is above 0.7.
3.2 Experimental investigation # 2: p = k/n
Parameter p strikes a trade-off between the speed and the accuracy of the es-
timator. Eq.(4) tells us that the lower p is, the faster is the estimation of pfa.
However, (7) and (8) show that the relative variance and the bias are decreasing
functions of p.
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Figure 3: Typical evolution of the intermediate thresholds when µ is too small.
Intermediate thresholds are taken from the same estimator runs as used in Fig. 1
with µ = 0.01.
The experimental set up is the following: L = 20, τ = 0.95, µ = 0.2, and
pfa = 4.704 ∗ 10−11. We try two values for p: 3/4 and 1/2. We run 1,000
estimations {p̂(i)fa} to measure the relative bias as (Mean({p̂
(i)
fa})− pfa)/pfa, the
relative standard deviation Std({p̂(i)fa})/pfa, and the relative maximum deviation
(Max({p̂(i)fa})− pfa)/pfa. Figures 4 and 5 plots these values against the number
of particles n.
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Figure 4: Statistics measured for 1,000 estimation runs with k/n = 1/2.
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Figure 5: Statistics measured for 1,000 estimation runs with k/n = 3/4.
Observe first the excellence of the estimator. n = 12, 800 particles (last point
on curves) represent around 1,000,000 detection trials for p = 3/4 or around
430, 000 for p = 1/2. Any estimation yielded a result between 4.0 ∗ 10−11 and
5.7∗10−11 with p = 3/4, or between 3.6∗10−11 and 6.0∗10−11 with p = 1/2. The
relative standard deviation represents less than 10%. A classical MC estimator
would need more than 2.1012 detection trials to achieve such a precision.
Surprisingly enough, the measured variance and bias follow the laws (7)
and (8) known for the asymptotic regime even for a low number of particles1.
Yet, the asymptotic regime is only achieved if the estimations are Gaussian
distributed. An Arderson Darling test [14] reveals that this is the case only
for the biggest values of n. This happens quicker for p closer to one according
to the scores of Table 3.2: estimations {p̂(i)fa} are deemed Gaussian distributed
when n equals 6, 400 for p = 3/4 whereas this hypothesis is clearly rejected for
p = 1/2.
n 200 400 800 1, 600 3, 200 6, 400 12, 800
p = 1/2 32.40 12.46 5.35 4.42 2.87 1.82 0.38
p = 3/4 23.53 9.16 2.96 1.76 1.46 0.50 0.53
Table 1: Anderson-Darling test on 1,000 estimation runs for p = 1/2 and p =
3/4. The hypothesis of Gaussian distribution is accepted when the score is lower
than 0.752 with a significance level of 0.05.
Our conclusions of this experiment are the following. There are two typical
use cases of our algorithm. If the user looks for the order of magnitude of
the probability to be estimated, then the choice p = 1/2 with around n =
1The bias is not measured with enough precision with only 1,000 trials for n = 12, 800
because its order of magnitude is 0.001 times the value of pfa.
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2, 000 particules gives a fast estimation (around 68,000 detection trials). This is
especially true since the variance (7) and the bias (8) are not drastically bigger
than the ones for p = 3/4. If the issue is to assess an estimation with a given
accuracy and confidence range, then the estimator must be in the asymptotic
regime where the pdf of the estimation error is known. This experiment shows
that a ratio 3/4 (i.e. closer to one) is advised. Each estimation lasts longer but,
in the end, this is the quickest way to achieve the asymptotic regime.
This experimental work also stresses what we still ignore: The standard
deviation and the bias are in practice bigger than the theoretical expressions.
This is normal as these latter are theoretical lower bounds. However, we ignore
the scaling factor. Other experiments showed that it does not depend on L.
We suppose however that there is a strong relationship with the detection score
function. This prevents us from establishing confidence ranges supported with
the Gaussian distribution in the asymptotic regime. This strategy implies a
heavy experimental work, where a hundred of estimations are needed in order
to first confirm the asymptotic regime, and second, to estimate the standard
deviation. Then, the probability of false alarm is lower than Mean({p̂(i)fa}) + 2 ∗
Std({p̂(i)fa}) with a confidence of 97.7%.
A faster way to yield a confidence interval is to observe the number of it-
erations of several independent estimations. For p = 1/2 and n ≥ 800, more
than two thirds of the estimations end at N = 34 iterations (see Fig. 6), which
gives a confidence interval of [pN , pN+1] = [2.91, 5.82] ∗ 10−11. For p = 3/4 and
n ≥ 1, 600, more than two third of the estimations end at N = 82 iterations
(see Fig. 7), which gives a confidence interval of [pN , pN+1] = [4.26, 5.69]∗10−11.
Once again, a bigger p provides more accurate results but at the cost of slower
estimations.
3.3 Error exponents for zero-rate watermarking scheme
A watermarking scheme is deemed as sound if its probability of false alarm
and its probability of false negative decrease exponentially with the dimension
L of the signals under an embedding power constraint. Within this class, the
comparison of two watermarking schemes can be based on their exponential
decreasing rates, i.e. their error exponents defined as follows:
Efa(τ) = − lim
L→+∞
1
L
log pfa, Efn(τ) = − lim
L→+∞
1
L
log pfn. (12)
There are very few watermarking schemes where error exponents have closed
form expressions [13]: For instance, the additive spread spectrum with a single
nappe hypercone detection region, the improved sign embedder with a dual
nappe hypercone detection region. Furthermore, these theoretical expressions
do not foresee a noisy channel (i.e. attack) to calculate Efn(τ). In practice, it
is extremely hard to estimate these error exponents because huge values of L
should imply very very low probabilities of errors if the watermaking scheme is
good. This is no more a problem with our algorithm, and we simply estimate
the error exponents by Êfa(τ) = − log p̂fa/L and Êfn(τ) = − log p̂fn/L with a
given big enough L.
For the false negative, the rare event is that a watermarked (and possibly
attacked) vector has a score below a small threshold. At each step, the estimator
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Figure 6: Confidence intervals are smaller as number of particles increases.
Percentage of estimations over 1,000 runs for k/n = 1/2.
Figure 7: Confidence intervals are smaller as number of particles increases.
Percentage of estimations over 1,000 runs for k/n = 3/4.
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sets τj as the k-th highest scores. Hence, the intermediate thresholds are indeed
decreasing. We can also study the impact of an attack on Efn as soon as the
attack vector n has a statistical model with the two following properties:
• We are able to generate vectors distributed as pN,
• There exists a modification process with a controllable strength that lets
this distribution invariant.
Then, a particle is now a couple of vectors {x,n}, and its score is the detection
function applied to the attacked and watermarked vector: d(z) = d(w(x) + n),
where w(.) : RL 7→ RL is the watermark embedding function. The replication
process changes both vectors of the particle, each one with its law invariant
modification process. Another technical detail is that our algorithm is run
only once, storing the intermediate thresholds in order to estimate the mapping
{Êfn(τj), τj}. The same holds for the false alarm error exponents {Êfa(τ ′j), τj ′}.
An interpolation finally gives {Êfa(τj), Êfn(τj)}.
The experimental setup is the following: L = 4000, host vectors are Gaussian
distributed with variance σX = 1. The embedding power equals Pe = 0.1.
We test three watermarking schemes: Additive spread spectrum scheme with
d(x) = xT u/‖x‖, ‘improved’ sign embedder with d(x) = |xT u|/‖x‖ as detailed
in [13], and the JANIS scheme with order 2 [8]. For the first two schemes,
the relationship between Efa(τ) and the threshold τ is perfectly known [13].
However, there is no expression for Efn(τ) under an attack (here a Gaussian
white noise with variance σ2N = 0.1). For the JANIS scheme, we have to estimate
both Efa(τ) and Efn(τ). Fig. 8 shows the results.
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Figure 8: Error exponent experimental measurement. Efn against Efa. Solid
line: theoretical curves (without noise). Dash-dot line: Experimental curve
(without noise). Dotted line: Experimental curve (with AGWN σ2N = 10.Pe).
From an experimental point of view, the measurements are good with only
a small inaccuracy. We blame two shortcomings. L is not big enough and
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the ratio L−1 log pfa (idem with the false negative exponent) does not reflect
the rate of the exponential decay. A better way would be to estimate log(pfa)
for several values of L and to estimate the exponent with a linear regression.
Second, these plots were obtained very rapidly with our algorithm working with
only a n = 3, 200 vectors stack, and k = n/2. Therefore, the accuracy of the
estimation of pfa itself is not at best. But, we are indeed interested in showing
that error exponents can be measured very rapidly: The experimental curves
for the additive and improved watermarking scheme have the right shape (in
particular for the improved scheme, Efn goes to infinity when Efa goes to zero).
In the same way, the range of the measurements is limited by the maximum
number of iterations allowed, which is here set to 200.
From a watermarking point of view, it is quite difficult to announce which
scheme performs better. All of them share the same detection complexity. The
improved scheme has the advantage of an infinite Efn when there is no attack.
JANIS performances curve seems to be better only at high Efa. Yet, perfor-
mances of course collapse with the presence of an attack, but JANIS seems to
be more robust of the three compared schemes.
4 Application to probabilistic fingerprinting code
Fingerprinting is the application where a content server gives personal copies of
the same content to n different buyers. c of them are dishonest users, called col-
luders, who mix their copies to yield a pirated content. A binary fingerprinting
code is a set of N different m bit sequences {xi}i∈[N ]. Each sequence identifying
a user has to be hidden in the personal copy with a watermarking technique.
When a pirated copy is found, the server retrieves a m bit sequence and accuses
some users or nobody. There are two kinds of errors: accusing an innocent (i.e.
a false alarm) and accusing none of the colluders (i.e. a false negative). The
designers of the fingerprinting code must assess the minimum length of the code
so that the probabilities of error are below some significance levels: pfa < ǫ1 and
pfn < ǫ2. One of the best fingerprinting codes is a probabilistic code proposed
by G. Tardos [15], where m = O(c2 log 1ǫ1 ). Before Tardos’ work, the existence
of such a short code was only theoretically proven. Tardos is the first to exhibit
a construction which is, moreover, surprisingly simple. The main point of in-
terest for us is that the accusation is based on the calculus of scores and their
comparison to a threshold. Consequently, this fingerprinting code is very well
suited with respect to our algorithm.
4.1 New accusation strategy
In Tardos probabilistic fingerprinting code, the accusation is focused: The de-
tection decides whether a given user is guilty or not. It calculates his score from
the code sequence of the user and the sequence recovered in the pirated copy.
The user is deemed guilty when his score is higher than a threshold. The size
of the collusion c, the probabilities ǫ1 and ǫ2 are the inputs of the code. The
outputs are the code length m and the value of the threshold T .
We think that this approach is not adapted in practice. We believe that the
length of the code sequence to be embedded in content is not tunable but fixed
by the payload of the watermarking technique and the length of the content. It
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is clear that the longer the sequence is, the better the accusation process works.
But, in practice, there is certainly a wide range in the length of the sequences
to be embedded due to a wide diversity of contents. In the same way, it might
be complicated to derive the right value of the threshold for different sequence
lengths. We propose a different approach. Once we have recovered the sequence
y in the pirated copy, we calculate all the scores of the users to which the
content has been delivered and accuse the most likely guilty users, i.e. the ones
with the highest scores. In the sequel, consider that user j is accused because
j = arg maxi∈[N ] Si. There is no longer need of a threshold. However, we cannot
guaranty a probability ǫ1. To be fair, the output of our accusation process is the
index j of the most likely guilty user associated with the probability of making
an error, i.e. the probability that an innocent gets a score bigger or equal to Sj
knowing the pirate sequence y: Prob(SCORE(x,y) > Sj |y).
We use our algorithm to estimate this probability where x is distributed as a
code sequence. Particules in this framework are now binary sequences of length
m. The GENERATE and the SCORE functions are given by the construction of the
code and its accusation method [15]. One very important fact is that the symbols
in a code sequence are statistically independent and distributed according to
their own law. The MODIFY function is thus very simple: we randomly select a
fraction µ of them (parameter µ sets the replication strength), and re-generate
them according to their own law. These non deterministic changes leave the
distribution of the code sequence invariant.
4.2 Code length
We now come back to the original Tardos focused accusation process. Typical
papers about Tardos code [16, 17, 18] aim to find the tightest lower bound of
the length, i.e. to find the lower constant A so that m > Ac2 log 1ǫ1 implies
that the constraints on the probabilities of error are fulfilled. In the original
Tardos’ paper, ǫ2 is set to ǫ
c/4
1 , and A = 100 for his asymmetric code. In
our experiments, we use the symmetric version of Tardos code as proposed by
Skoric [17] where A = 50 thanks to the symmetry. The goal of this subsection
is to experimentally find this constant A, which is a priori challenging because
ǫ1 is very low.
The experiment is twofold. First, we need to estimate the plot mapping ǫ1
and the threshold T , for different couples (c, m). We generate c code sequences of
length m. The collusion strategy is to randomly pick up the symbols of pirated
copy y among the c colluders’ sequences. Then, we estimate the curve T =
F−1(Prob(SCORE(x,y) > T |y)) with our algorithm. Indeed, the target threshold
is fixed to a very high value so that the algorithm stops after Nmax iterations.
The obtained mapping is indeed Nmax couples (Tj , (k/n)
j). However, this holds
for a special occurrence of y. Therefore, we need to integrate this conditional
probability by integrating it over K different sequences {yi}i∈[K]. Each time,
c code sequences are drawn independently and uniformly to forge a pirated
sequence. The j-th threshold is averaged over the K estimates.
The second part of the experiment measures the false negative probability
ǫ2. A particle is now a set of c Tardos sequences {x1, . . . ,xc} plus an allo-
cation sequence a which dictates the way to produce y from the c sequences:
y(k) = xa(k)(k), ∀k ∈ [m]. The indices stored in a are independent and iden-
tically distributed over [c]. The MODIFY function is twofold. It independently
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modifies the c Tardos sequences as described above, and it modifies the allo-
cation sequence by randomly selecting a fraction µ of indices and draw them
against the uniform law over [c].
The SCORE function is more complicated. From a particle, it generates the
pirated sequence y thanks to its allocation sequences, and calculates the c ac-
cusation sums. The score of the particle is then their mean or their maximum.
Tardos and his followers based their analysis on the mean of the scores of the
colluders because this leads to tractable equations. The rationale is that if the
mean is above the threshold, then there is at least one colluder whose score is
higher than the threshold. However, the probability that the mean is below
the threshold T is a very rough estimate of the probability of false negative ǫ2.
We choose to follow Tardos’ choice of the mean to appreciate the refinement
about the constant A given by our experimental investigation compared to the
constants found by Tardos and his followers via Chernoff bounds. However, we
can also set the score of a particle as the maximum of the c accusation sums in
order to really estimate ǫ2 as the probability that none of the c colluders gets
caught.
The rest of the second part works like the first part. We are interested by
estimating the mapping T = F−1(Prob(maxi∈[c] SCORE(xi,y) < T )) (max or
mean) using our algorithm. The experiment is run K times, and the interme-
diate thresholds are averaged for a better precision. Then, we plot in the same
figure (see Fig. 9) the false positive mapping and the false negative mapping, ex-
cept that for this latter one, the probability is taken to the power 4/c to provide
a fair comparison to previous evaluations of constant A where ǫ2 was set to ǫ
c/4
1 .
The intersection of the two mappings at a point (T0(m, c), ǫ0(m, c)) implies that
it is possible to find a threshold such that ǫ1 = ǫ0(m, c) and ǫ2 = ǫ0(m, c)
c/4.
This value indeed reflects the best we can do given m and c. We cannot achieve
a lower significance level while preserving the relationship ǫ2 = ǫ
c/4
1 because it
doesn’t exist any threshold fulfilling this constrain at a lower significance level
than ǫ0(m, c). The only way to get lower significance levels is to increase the
code length for a given collusion size.
Several experimentations have been carried on with m ∈ {100, 150, 200, 300,
400, 600} and c ∈ {2, 3, 4} to obtain different values of ǫ0(m, c). The final plot
draws m against the function c2 log ǫ0(m, c)
−1, see Fig. 10. Some comments are
in order. The curves are surprisingly straight so that the length of the code is
really asymptotically equal to Ac2 log ǫ−11 . The constraints on the significance
levels are fulfilled if A ≥ 8.0 (resp. A ≥ 7.6), when we based our estimation of
the false negative on the mean (resp. maximum) of the colluders score. The
code we used being symmetric, Tardos equivalent was A = 50 and Skoric et al.
found A = 2π2 ≈ 19.7 with a Chernoff bound, or A = π2 ≈ 9.9 with a Gaussian
distribution approximation of the accusation sums. The differences between
evaluations based on mean or maximum are bigger when the size of collusion
increases, which is not a surprise. The mean based evaluations are overestimat-
ing the power of the colluders. For a given threshold T , it is much more difficult
to forge a pirated copy such that the maximum of the accusation sums is below
T , than to forge a pirated copy such that the mean of the accusation is below
T . This has two consequences. The coefficient A is lower when its estimation
is based on the maximum. In the non asymptotical regime, the code length is
estimated by m = Ac2 log ǫ−11 + B. The offset B is lower when working with
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the maximum. For instance, estimations based on maximum give codes shorter
of around 100 symbols for c = 3. This is quite substantial in practice.
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Figure 9: Mappings of the false positive probability (blue) and false negative
probability (red) against the threshold. m = 200, c ∈ {2, 3, 4}. The score of a
particle is the mean of the c colluders scores.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
m
c
2
 . log 1/ε
 
 
c=2
c=3
c=4
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2 for c = 2, 3 or 4 colluders,
against function c2 log ǫ−11 . ǫ2 has been estimated with the mean of the colluders’
scores (solid lines) or their maximum (dotted lines).
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5 Conclusion
We have presented an algorithm estimating probabilities of rare events. It works
for a kind of rare events defined via a scalar score being above a threshold. The
algorithm is far more powerful than the classical Monte Carlo estimator because
it provides much more accurate estimations while needing much less runs of the
rare event detector (or less calculus of score function). Several runs of this
estimator allow to rapidly give small confidence intervals.
This algorithm is very well suited for watermarking issues because errors
(false positive or false negative) belong to this kind of rare event. Hence, this
algorithm has been shown very useful to evaluate probability of false or error
exponent in zero-bit watermarking, probability of accusing an innocent user
and probability of missing a colluder in a fingerprinting scenario. This helps
setting a fingerprinting code length to ensure that these probabilities are below a
significance level. This is also very useful to propose a global accusation process
which outputs the most likely dishonest user while estimating the probability
that this user is indeed innocent.
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